

Reflections on Glock's Conception of Analytic Philosophy

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Abstract: The paper tries to critically expose Hans-Johann Glock's *What is Analytic Philosophy?* In this work, Glock identifies the limitations within the geographical, linguistic, historical, methodological, metaphysical and normative oriented conceptions of analytic philosophy. By developing a comparison of analytic and continental philosophy, he shows that no strict criteria could be employed in order to make such a distinction. In return he emphasizes the idea of a family resemblance amongst different proponents and strands of thought within the analytic tradition. This family resemblance is used to explore whether or not there is an underlying thread that is manifested in the different orientations that are identified under analytic philosophy. By analyzing Glock's conception of analytic philosophy, it will be argued that, the book successfully shows the limitations of conventional definitions of analytic philosophy, exposes the current attempt to equate scientism and logical positivism with analytic philosophy in general, and also demonstrates the relevance of the analytic tradition in today's world where the need for analysis is more than ever required. It does not limit the significance of analytic philosophy to the analysis of language and shown how there is also an interest in metaphysical and epistemological considerations. Still, Glock also needs to further articulate his thesis of family resemblance, and show whether it constitutes an orientation, philosophical current or perspective within the analytic tradition.

Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Analysis, Family Resemblance

1. Introduction

Currently in the attempts to understand the nature of analytic philosophy, questions like, when did analytic philosophy emerge and who are the precursors, what are the problematics that it tries to grapple with, what type of methodological orientations and tool does it try to introduce and how does it relate to continental and other approaches, are being raised. Here, for Biletzki and Matar analytic philosophy is characterized by the usage of analysis as a tool of interrogation, trying to uncouple truth from subjective mental states and cognition from solitary experience, situating logic as the ground of truth and developing critique of Kantian metaphysics. As such, "it rejected the intelligibility of synthetic a priori truth, and denied that pure reason alone can attain any knowledge of reality." [2] Still evolving a definition of analytic philosophy that resolves the controversies regarding its origins, methodological orientations and approaches is a difficult task.

Beaney traces analytic philosophy in "the work of Gottlob

Frege (1848–1925), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), G. E. Moore (1873–1958) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) in the period from roughly 1880 to 1920." [1] Based on this Juhl and Loomis further traced the emergence of analytic philosophy to the notion that "we should not expect to find the conditions which make experience possible in that very experience." [6] Martinich and Sosa argued that the contemporary form of analytic philosophy came into fruition with the contribution of philosophical ideas from Germany and England that focused on the value of analyzing propositions, language and logic and elementary foundational blocks of language. Here, "concepts and hence philosophy would be of no use if they did not make contact with the non-conceptual world." [7] In this paper, a critical exposition of Glock's conception of analytic philosophy will be developed.

Glock's analysis in *What is Analytic Philosophy?* is organized around nine chapters. In chapter one he situates the problematics of analytic philosophy, and chapter two

develops a historical analysis of analytic philosophy. Chapter three in return explores the limitations of geographic and linguistic definitions of analytic philosophy, whereas in chapter four, the relation between the analytic tradition and historical consciousness is analyzed. Chapter five develops a critique of metaphysical thinking, psychologism and the relation between philosophy and science, chapter six focuses on the viability of using methodological and analytic tools to understand analytic philosophy is explored, the seventh chapter explores the relation of analytic philosophy to ethics and politics, chapter eight introduces the idea of family resemblance to situate analytic philosophy in the contemporary intellectual landscape and, finally chapter nine, that is devoted to understanding the challenge of postmodernism and relativism, the relation of analytic philosophy to public life and current points of inquiry within the analytic tradition.

The paper starts off by introducing the general aim of Glock in his quest to understand the current status of the analytic tradition. In section one, Glock's attempt to situate analytic philosophy in the history of philosophy will be discussed. Section two examines the geographical, linguistic and historical conceptions of analytic philosophy whereas in the third section, the attempt to define analytic philosophy based on philosophical doctrines and methodological orientations will be assessed. In section four, analytic philosophy and the active engagement in social issues will be discussed. This is followed by section five where the idea of family resemblance and contemporary status of analytic philosophy is analyzed. Finally, in section six, critical examination of Glock's *What is Analytic Philosophy* will be developed.

2. Situating Analytic Philosophy in the History of Philosophy

As Hans-Johann Glock puts it, the purpose of his work is not to serve as a general survey examining the main issues articulated by the proponents of analytic philosophy or to map out the genesis and evolution of the analytic tradition. On the contrary, he engages in a critical exposition of major strands of thought articulated so far within the analytic tradition. As such, his approach "considers past, present and future; and it tries to distinguish and rule out alternative answers in a sustained manner." [4].

2.1. Points of Departures and Precursors

For Glock, despite being a recent tradition in the history of philosophy, analytic philosophy has grown immensely in its stature to the point of becoming the most significant philosophical current. Despite this fact, critics equally contend that analytic philosophy is currently in a state of decline. Moreover, "a sense of crisis is palpable not just among commentators but also among some leading protagonists." [4] Analytic philosophers are critical towards the tendency of continental philosophers to mix rhetoric and

argument "as weapons of philosophical argument" [4] Nevertheless, the attempt to conceive all philosophy in terms of analytic and continental philosophy overshadows the viability of other philosophical traditions and, "the question then is not whether it is legitimate and fruitful to inquire into what analytic philosophy is, but how this should be done." [4].

Since most forms of understanding analytic philosophy try to survey and describe the way in which the subject is currently applied, Glock believes that such definitions must be tested against conventional usages and "be judged by the degree to which they are true to established usage and institutional practice." [4] Soames here argues that the foundations of the analytic tradition are laid by philosophers like Moore, Russel and Wittgenstein and although there are no fixed ideals within the tradition, still there is an emphasis on a detailed understanding of language, techniques of analysis and logical scrutiny. Thus one finds, "an implicit commitment-albeit faltering and imperfect-to the ideals of clarity, rigor, and argumentation." [9].

Glock assumes that historically looking at the genesis of analysis, one could identify two origins. The first one resides in a Socratic analysis that tries to get at a conceptual clarity. This constitutes, "the dissection or resolution of a given concept into component concepts, components that in turn can be used to define the complex concept." [4] Secondly one has a mathematical analysis and analysis of propositions. In modern philosophy, whereas Spinoza's approach was geometric, Descartes appealed to evident axiomatic blocks. Furthermore for Leibniz, "in all true propositions the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject." [4] Seeking a resolution Kant explores what is out of the bounds of cognition as well as what is accountable for the possibility of cognition.

Being challenged by the sciences, eventually two responses to Hegelianism emerged. The naturalist response made recourse to abandoning "all metaphysical speculation and a priori reasoning." [4] Neo-Kantianism as a second response sought to prove that the role of philosophy is neither to study transcendent world nor to serve as an empirical modality of knowledge. In Frege an attempt was made to develop a system of math from logic in the project of logicism. Here, "logicism seeks to define the concepts of mathematics in purely logical terms (including that of a set), and to derive its propositions from self-evident logical principles." [4] Besides Frege, Russel alongside Whitehead in *Principia Mathematica* sought to provide a strong foundation for formal logic. Still after being refuted by Godel's assertion that search for ultimate foundations must be abandoned, the current appropriation understanding of logicism concentrates on its methods rather than philosophical aspirations.

2.2. Logical Analysis, the Linguistic Turn and Analytic Philosophy

Glock situates the emergence of the linguistic turn in Wittgenstein's challenge to the four dominant ways of

conceptualizing the nature of logic. The first view assumed that logic relies on probability and samples, the second one on inner psychological states, the third on objective essence and the fourth on “access by abstraction from non-logical propositions.” [4] Such an influence is recognized by Weitz who argues that, the “claim in the Tractatus that philosophy is an activity, not a body of propositions, implies the rejection of all ontological pursuits.” [11] Wittgenstein exerted a lasting influence on logical positivists who assumed that the role of sensory experience must be explored by the application of the rules of logic.

The logical positivists advocated the principle of verification which insists that metaphysics ought to be abandoned for it is neither true by definition nor dependent on experience. This assumes that philosophy’s “task is the logico-linguistic analysis of those propositions which alone are strictly speaking meaningful, namely those of science.” [4] After the logical positivists came the Cambridge analysts who despite disagreeing with critique of metaphysics, and verification principle espoused by logical positivists, still inherited the analysis of statements and the empirical base of knowledge from the tradition. Carnap further pursued such a project in seeking not a simple conceptual translation but artificial language.

After the rise of Nazism, proponents of logical positivism relocated in the U.S. and eventually the movement led into the division between “logical constructionism and conceptual analysis.” [4] The ideas of Quine also originated in such a context. He argues that the attempt to integrate all propositions into a whole is reductionist. Again Karl Popper’s philosophy of science tried to demarcate between science and pseudoscience while Kuhn and Feyerabend tried to identify the revolutionary nature of scientific revolutions and lack of conceptual translation amongst contending worldviews. Gradually, Quine’s views on ontology created the space for metaphysical speculation whereas Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics tried to identify what underlies our systems of thought and understanding of reality and role of higher level analysis.

The attempt to explore the nature of ontology, eventually led to the treatment of language as a distinct point of analysis [3]. Here philosophy of language is organized effort to explore language, while linguistic philosophy is a detailed and specific analytic exercise. Thus, “philosophy of language is interested in the workings of actual languages rather than in the construction of artificial ones.” [4] The idea of situating meaning in its applications was criticized by Grice who argues that such an understanding is not useful for theories of meaning and Chomsky’s linguistics which further undermined theories of external meaning. This paved the way for the importance of the philosophy of mind in analytic philosophy.

In the moral dimension of analytic philosophy, for Moore, ‘the good’ is not describeable one commits the naturalistic fallacy in identifying ‘the good’ with physical properties. Emotivism here advocated fact and values distinction and was accused of trying to “ignore the role that reason plays in

moral argument.” [4] Again under Rawls, the idea of seeking a rational foundation to politics was entertained.

3. Examining Geographical, Linguistic and Historical Conceptions of Analytic Philosophy

In chapter three, Glock tries to explore the dynamism between geographical space and meaning formation. Going beyond a mere geographical connotation he argues that “the real philosophical divisions cut across all geographical and linguistic borders.” [4].

3.1. Exploring the Geo-linguistic Connotations of Analytic Philosophy

In sketching the relation between continental and analytic philosophy, Glock argues that, the notion of analytic philosophy was initially expressed in Mill’s discussion of the “German influences on Coleridge.” [4] Despite all criticisms, the geographical qualification on continent and analytic philosophy still persists being promoted by writer and journals on the subject. Furthermore, “contemporary continental philosophers also give succor to the Anglocentric model by identifying analytic philosophy with Anglo-American philosophy”. [4].

For Glock, one shouldn’t discard the influence of German thinkers on analytic philosophy, and the fact that analytic philosophers like Russell affirmed the influence of the continental tradition on their thoughts. One thing that led to the easy adoption of analytic philosophy in American soil is the already existence “of an indigenous form of logically minded empiricism derived from American pragmatism”. [4] Subsequently the influence of the logical positivist in America was clearly exhibited in the areas of logic, meaning, philosophy of mind and speculative philosophizing.

Some critics contended that in the German soil, one finds a tradition originating with Kant and another one which is “an Austrian tradition which starts with Bolzano”. (Ibid, 74) Such a conception goes beyond the conventional opposition between empiricism and rationalism, analytic and continental [10]. What is discarded in only situating the Anglo Austrian axis as the origin of analytic philosophy is the immense “cultural, political and academic connections between Germany and the Habsburg Empire.” [4] One philosophical approach that doesn’t conform into the analytic and continental divide is American pragmatism. It “forges a link between truth and human welfare, and hence between cognitive and moral issues.” [4].

3.2. Historical Parameters of the Analytic Tradition

Analytic philosophy is regarded as ahistorical and continental and traditional philosophers see analytic philosophy as one that “lacks historical awareness” [4] The criticism on history could be forwarded in terms of neglecting and discarding history and anachronism that is

found in distorting history. For Glock, analytic philosophers clearly affirmed the influence of past philosophers on their orientations and also showed a great interest in ancient philosophy. Furthermore continental philosophes like Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were also critical of equating philosophy with history. Here, "analytic philosophy is guided by the conviction that there is a difference between philosophy and the history of philosophy". [4] Even scientists cannot disregard the role of history since their ideas usually evolve as a response to existing solutions.

One important element in the discussion over the role of history in analytic philosophy is the Kantian distinction between the context in which theories are discovered and the justifications given. Here, analytic philosophers charged the attempt to situate history as a platform for philosophical and scientific ideals with the "genetic fallacy", the mistake of deducing claims about the validity of a theory or the content of a concept from information about its historical origins, including information about the causes of its emergence." [4] For Glock, since philosophy as a discipline tries to contemplate rational and speculative ideals alongside empirical evidence, it draws historical lessons and insights. To the charge that analytic philosophers consciously distort history, they have responded by charging that historicists are not critical enough towards tradition. One other challenge presented by historicists, is the thesis of incommensurability. This casts doubt on the ability to mediate and measure contending paradigms because of the radical nature of diverging alternatives. Even the embracing of epistemic incommensurability for Glock could be refuted by focusing on internal logic of ideas and "the background of a more or less extensive context, it does not follow that they can only be understood by accepting that context." [4].

4. Defining Analytic Philosophy Based on Philosophical Doctrines and Methodological Orientations

In chapter five, doctrines and topics, Glock tries to distinguish the essence of analytic philosophy from a focus on its methodological orientations. He remarks, "We might call such topical or doctrinal conceptions of analytic philosophy 'material', to distinguish them from formal (methodological and stylistic) conceptions" [4].

4.1. Thematic Areas of Analytic Philosophy

The conventional view of analytic philosophy associates it to a critique of metaphysical thinking. Critics argue that philosophy "must deal with something more serious than mere words, namely the things they stand for, and ultimately the essence of reality or of the human mind." [4] Still, in the current context, one sees the revival of metaphysics in the analytic tradition and the growing interest in the analysis of normative issues broadened the boundaries of analytic philosophy to engage both with perennial problems as well as everyday life. The advent of analytic philosophy could also

be situated in the critique of psychologism. For psychologism inner mental states of the individual determine the nature of thought and cognition. Here, "psychologism comes in at least three different forms – transcendental, empiricist and naturalistic." [4] Ultimately, the notion of linguistic commerce and logical analysis were issues of importance even before the advent of analytic philosophy and there must be a demarcation between "the rise of analytic philosophy on the one hand, its later linguistic turn on the other" [4].

Another important point of analysis concerns the connection between analytic philosophy and science. There are two ways of articulating such relationship. The former resides in drawing a distinction between true by definition and true by experience pronouncements of truth. Particularly for the Vienna circle, philosophy is a "second-order discipline that reflects on the 'logic of science'" [4]. A second way of conceptualizing the relation between analytic philosophy and science is found in naturalism. All three forms of naturalism are reductive in their nature. Trying to explain anomalies, naturalists can either regard other views as not genuine or authentic or subsume all forms into the scientific apparatus. Here being reductionist "the aim of such an enterprise is to demonstrate that the phenomenon in question is real only because it is really something else" [4]. Contemporary analytic philosophy overcomes its traditional focus on logic and meaning into the ethical, aesthetic and political components of the philosophical enterprise and "for any significant area of human thought x, there is not just a philosophy of x but also an analytic philosophy of x." [4].

For some, since there are no defining characteristics of analytic philosophy, an alternative approach would try to probe the methodological orientations of analytic philosophy. Still after evaluating claims that analytic philosophy is distinguished by its methods and clarity that is distinct because it follows scientific apparatus Glock argues, "I find myself compelled to conclude that the achievement or even the pursuit of a clear style is no longer a hallmark of analytic philosophy." [4] Again an attempt to equate the essence of analytic philosophy with philosophical argumentation is also problematized.

4.2. Procedures Employed by the Analytic Tradition

The idea of analysis is seen as the paradigmatic feature of analytic philosophy. Still, there are different ways of understanding the nature of analysis. The most dominant form of analysis is seen as reducing larger propositions into elementary compositions and rudimentary elements. Such an approach "remains committed to the idea that complex concepts or entities can be broken down into simpler and ontologically more basic ones." [4].

There is a dominant attempt to situate analytic philosophy as a scientifically oriented philosophical approach, contrasted with continental tradition's leaning towards the social sciences [5]. Here, "the idea is that any philosophical investigation, even a second-order logical or conceptual one, should proceed in a scientific spirit, guided by the same ethos and methodological principles." [4] For Schwartz also, one

essential characteristics of analytic philosophy is the attempt to imitate the models and methods developed by the sciences. It is asserted that, “philosophers can no longer expect to make significant contributions to philosophy of language and philosophy of mind without a firm background in the relevant areas of the social or natural sciences.” [8] Besides its appeal to science, it’s assumed that analytic philosophy uses a method of thought puzzles and experiments. It’s also asserted that whereas analytic philosophers are devoted to a detailed analysis and step by step investigation, continental philosophers are devoted to system building. Although clarity was definitely a characteristic of early analytic philosophers, the enigmatic nature of some continental philosophers is also expressed in the analytic tradition. Glock maintains, “Unfortunately, the speech of many contemporary analytic philosophers is as plain as a baroque church and as clear as mud.” [4] After exploring the essence and methodology of analytic philosophy, Glock tries to discuss the extent to which analytic philosophers try to discuss issues of everyday life that have a normative orientation.

5. Analytic Philosophy and Active Engagement in Social Issues

Glock in the seventh chapter tries to refute the claim that analytic philosophers are not preoccupied with issues of ethics and politics. He tries to show the leanings of the analytic philosophers to the left and also the exclusive political engagements that they had endeavored. Initially it’s true that most analytic philosophers “shunned ethics in favor of logic, epistemology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.” [4] Still, precursors of the tradition like Bolzano and Brentano had well developed moral philosophies and Russel, Neurath, Schilick and Ayer also reflected on ethical and political issues. Still, Glock asks, were such positions in ethics and politics integral components of their philosophies.

In Moore, a systematic conception of ethics was developed although it was appropriated by traditionalist philosophers later on. Currently the importance of ethics and politics in analytic philosophy is illuminated by “the rise of cognitivism in moral philosophy, the emergence of applied ethics, and the rehabilitation of grand political theory in the wake of Rawls.” [4] As such analytic philosophers are pioneering discussions in such fields and even going beyond the analysis of normative presuppositions into the articulation of ethical judgments.

Wilshire charges that analytic philosophy limits the horizon of human cognition to propositions that can be logically analyzed and in the process discards the role of passions and emotions. As such, “the analytic tendency to divide the emotive from the cognitive, and the moral from the factual, is disastrous.” [12] He further contends that in its attempt analyze founding propositions and reduce phenomenon into primordial elements, analytic philosophy detaches one from the context and dissolves all identities and

horizons. Hence, “analytic philosophy tends powerfully to put us at a remove from everything, even from our own selves, selves turned ghostly.” [12] This goes against openness to what cannot be grasped, dynamism and dialogical encounters made possible by philosophical analysis. In the final resort, analytic philosophy’s demystification of truth leads into a negation of values and hence embraces nihilism.

Because of its earlier preoccupation with meta-ethics analytic philosophy is conceived as being value free, of having no interest in politics and as such legitimating existing relations. This is sharply contrasted to continental philosophy’s analysis of existing relations as well as calls for intervention. Critical theory heavily promoted such a narrow conception of analytic philosophy in labeling the tradition as repressive, fascist and conservative. Here, Glock maintains, “at least prima facie the idea that analytic philosophy is apolitical or conservative, let alone reactionary or authoritarian, is flabbergasting.” [4] In reality prominent analytic philosophers pursued the causes of the left and progressive groups. As a practical response one could rival Russel’s exclusive preoccupations with politics and the issues of theodicy and the achievements of the Vienna circle in engaging in political debate and political activism.

Glock also tries to evaluate the claim that analytic philosophy is more progressive since from its genesis it involved a critique of traditional philosophy and this makes it emancipatory. Analytic philosophy persistently advocated a critique of rationality and theories of knowledge. Still, “analytic philosophy cannot lay claim to being the sole or even the most significant philosophical champion of such civic values.” [4] Analytic philosophy is not necessarily animated by a practical intent to change the world.

6. Family Resemblance and the Contemporary Status of Analytic Philosophy

Once Glock has exhausted the geographical, semantic and moral conceptions of analytic philosophy, he tries to explore analytic philosophy as a contested concept and arrives at the conclusion that “analytic philosophy is a tradition held together both by ties of mutual influence and by family resemblances.” [4] Still, one needs to probe, who are the members of the analytic orientation, who are the precursors and when did it come into fruition?

6.1. Family Resemblance and the Analytic Tradition

Glock believes that the family resemblance definition of analytic philosophy helps to overcome difficulties associated with previous definitions. The best approach is to treat analytic philosophy by the figures and approaches that emerged within the tradition, rather than positing a false thesis of analogous structural patterns followed by all philosophers. Here after exhausting the linguistic, metaphysical, scientific, reductive, logical and rationalistic

definitions of analytic philosophy, Glock argues that, "analytic definitions can be both too narrow and too wide." [4]

Glock also tries to evaluate a historical or genetic conception of analytic philosophy for which, different currents in the analytic tradition influenced one another, a dialogue emerged in points of analysis and as such, "analytic philosophy is first and foremost a historical sequence of individuals and schools that influenced, and engaged in debate with, each other, without sharing any single doctrine, problem or method." [4] To such an insistence one must ask what is the historical continuum characterized by analytic philosophy how one could fully exhaust contingencies and divergent practices within the tradition. The interaction between traditions is causal in its nature. As such, it must be situated in embedded relations, modes of organizations and practices. Either influencing analytic philosophers or being influenced by them is not sufficient enough to be identified as an analytic philosopher.

6.2. *Analytic Philosophy in the Contemporary Philosophical Landscape*

In chapter nine, Glock explores the contemporary relevance of analytic philosophy and its place "in a wider cultural context" [4] He discusses the relation of analytic philosophy to culture, postmodernism and society. In today's world of cultural and scientific wars, one must resist the use of false information and evidence to justify ideological alternatives and visions of relativism. This is seen in the Sokal hoax where false premises were used to transplant foundations of the natural sciences into a cultural program. As a solution Glock maintains, "Analytic philosophy should simply try to do better by its own standards." [4] He explores how the postmodern critique of reason, knowledge and science is also applicable to analytic philosophy and one "must distinguish between a war on postmodernism and a war on relativism or constructivism." [4].

Although the science wars helped to popularize analytic philosophy, still it's not the science wars that currently inform the nature of the continental and analytic divide or analytic philosophy's difference from other traditions. Furthermore, "while resistance to postmodernism may be a bona fide analytic cause, the crusade against relativism and constructionism is not." [4] Relativists err in trying to generalize their positions and assuming that no one could universalize scientific observations that have a local source. Glock at such juncture elaborates on four forms of relativism. Alethic, that resides in the assumption that diverse positions are essentially equal; ontological, which asserts that what exists is relative, conceptual that says meaning of concepts is relative and finally a methodological relativism which affirms diversity of orientations.

Glock also tries to evaluate the claim that analytic philosophy is too academic, is divorced from other subjects and the society, involves diverging factions and also had an "exclusionary demeanor towards non-Anglophone and non-analytic philosophy." [4] Regarding scholasticism, he presents the claim that analytic philosophy is only interested

on peculiar problems and only selected authors participate in the field. Against the tide of optimism, Glock maintains that for most of its parts today, analytic philosophy is degenerating and has exhausted its conceptual foundations. Especially, "scholasticism and specialization discourage interest from outsiders". [4] Because of this, one needs to demonstrate the social value of analytic philosophy and its interaction with other areas of human life. Academically, the once greater importance of Germanophone philosophy to analytic philosophy gradually declined. There is also skepticism towards analytic philosophy in Europe mainly being fueled by nationalistic agendas. Currently Glock witnesses ascendancy of Anglophone analytic philosophy.

Assuming that analytic philosophers must openly learn from other traditions and the analytic and continental divide turns out to be problematic, some have, "tried to synthesize the two, or at least to mediate between them." [4] Although such a synthesis is presented in approaches like post-analytic and post-continental philosophy, it still haven't gained momentum to set its own agendas within the existing traditions and also failed to evolve its own programs. Looking at fierce struggles and nonacademic attack between analytic and continental philosophers, Glock in the final resort argues, "if past experience is anything to go by, serious engagement between analytic and continental philosophy will not lead to conciliation, but to more pronounced estrangement." [4] What is then required is a discussion that clearly upholds the fruits of analytic and continental philosophy rather than a mere divide.

7. *Examining Glock's What Is Analytic Philosophy*

In the last sections, Glock's attempt to refute existing historical, geographic, linguistic, normative and major definitions of analytic philosophy, and in return emphasize the notion of a family resemblance will be exposed. In this section, the examination of *What is Analytic Philosophy is introduced*. One of the merits of Glock's analysis is successfully deconstructing the narrow conception of the analytic tradition being equated with a scientific and positivistic view of the world with no regards for issues of normativity, metaphysics and everyday interaction. As he shows such a picture of analytic philosophy emerges from the failure of analytic philosophers themselves to demonstrate the values of their works to the public, critical theory's narrow conceptions of analytic philosophy as well as the criticism of continental philosophers.

Glock shows that analytic philosophy neither neglects nor distorts history since it pays equal attention to different sites of knowledge and cognition. Again the analytic enterprise is not a simple geographic connotation since it owes its existence to different contexts and philosophical traditions, and currently cuts across philosophical boundaries to direct philosophical pursuits. Glock also demonstrates that analytic philosophy cannot be exhaustively explained by the linguistic

turn in philosophy since analytic philosophy is not reserved to the analysis of language and propositions.

Glock demonstrates the preoccupation with questions of metaphysics, ethics and politics within the analytic tradition. His assertions are supported by the fact that especially in the field of ethics; Meta ethicists were able to appropriate tools of analytic philosophy to probe the essence and signification of moral judgments, whereas practitioners of applied ethics also used such an analysis in morally controversial issues. Glock's argument for the relevance of analytic philosophy in the contemporary world is especially justifiable since there is a need for rational scrutiny, logical analysis and examination more than ever. In a world of post-truth where false information and fake news predominate, tools of analytic philosophy could be used as ways of fact checking and mediating discourse and truth. Despite all its achievements, Glock's conception of analytic philosophy needs to further elaborate on the notion of family resemblance which is proposed a resolution. Although Glock assumes that it's a guiding concept holding together all the trends and approaches within the analytic tradition, he still didn't show whether it's an orientation, philosophical current or perspective. Some questions that are left unanswered in such conception include, what is it that holds the members under the family resemblance and what is the challenge of the incommensurability of worldviews and contending perspectives to the attempt to posit a family resemblance.

Glock shows that the perceived divide between analytic and continental philosophy is untenable. One thing that is not fully analyzed in the difference between the two traditions is the advent of the socio-historical turn in philosophy where philosophical currents devoted their attention to existing structures, power relations and sites of truth. Again, Glock's discussion of postmodernism is more polemic than philosophical. It focuses only on the challenge presented by postmodernists on human consensus and process of validation and legitimation and in the process neglects its role in demystifying conceptions of rationality and setting up the space for new horizons of truth.

8. Conclusion

In *What is Analytic Philosophy?* Glock tries to examine the attempt to understand analytic philosophy based on epistemological origins, methodological apparatus, historical awareness, social activism and geographical context amongst others. In such an analysis, it is revealed that what divides analytic and continental philosophy is neither historical origin nor contemporary status, and that there is a need to defend analytic philosophy from the challenges of relativism and postmodernism. As a way out, Glock assumes that its

family resemblance that serves as the common thread that binds all aspects of the analytic tradition together. The idea of a family resemblance is contrasted to genetic theory, historical origins and geographical accounts. Glock's approach must be appreciated for identifying the limits of existing approaches to define analytic philosophy, defending analytic philosophy from scientism and anachronism and demonstrating the vitality of the analytic tradition in the current context. Ultimately he needs to further elaborate on the notion of family resemblance that is propounded as the central thesis of the book, for it needs clarification both in its essence as well as methodological orientation.

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