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Statistical Analysis of the Soviet Union's Dismantlement and Transportation of Materials in Northeast China Occupied by Japan

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Abstract: On the eve of Japan's surrender in 1945, the Soviet Union sent troops to Northeast China to attack the Japanese invaders. During the management vacuum period from the surrender of Japan to the takeover of Northeast China by the people's Republic of China, the Soviet Union dismantled and transported a large number of equipment and materials from the Japanese-occupied areas in Northeast China to the Soviet Union. However, China has no information about the details of this historical event. In 2009, the team led by Chinese historian Shen Zhihua translated and published the 1948-1976 intelligence files on China declassified by the United States in October 2004, including *the inquiry report on the Soviet Union's dismantlement of Japanese industrial equipment from Manchuria*. This report has become the most important first-hand information for studying this period of history. According to the *Inquiry Report*, the Soviet Union's dismantlement and transportation of equipment and materials from the Japanese-occupied areas in Northeast China was a national operation organized and led by the country's top leadership, specifically implemented by the Soviet army and Soviet citizens in Northeast China, and in which Japanese prisoners of war, technicians, and Chinese coolies were forced to participate. The operation dismantled and transported at least 75 factories, enterprises and a poison gas research institute from at least 30 cities and towns in 4 provinces in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia. It was transported to the Soviet Union by plane, ship, train and truck, settled in at least 49 towns, and established at least 81 factories and enterprises. It caused great losses to China.

Keywords: Demolition, Equipment and Material, Soviet Union, Northeast Japan-Occupied Area

1. Introduction

On 15 August, 1945, after Japan surrendered, the Soviet troops in China immediately began to demolish and transfer all kinds of materials and equipment from factories and enterprises in the Japanese-occupied areas of the Northeast to the Soviet Union, which did not stop until People's Republic of China (PRC) fully took over the Northeast. [1] How serious is the loss to China caused by this demolishing and transfer and what are the specific circumstances? It can only be seen by analyzing two declassified US archives. The first file, also the most important one, is the *Inquiry Report on the Dismantling of Japanese, Industrial Equipment from Manchuria by the Soviet Union* (Hereinafter referred to as the *Inquiry Report*), which was declassified in October 2004 and submitted to the President Truman by the U.S. State Department on October 8,1948. The second is *The Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria*, submitted to the President by Edwin W. Polly in July 1946. [2] (Hereinafter referred to as the '*Asset Report*').

The former file not only enriches and confirms the content provided by the latter one, but also supplements and improves the report. It is one of the extracted documents of China's first eight-volume *Declassified Archives of U.S. Intelligence on China* organized and translated by Shen Zhihua in 2007, because the U.S.'s original motivation for collecting this intelligence was to provide the top decision-making level of the government with the industrial structure, development level and trends, the general situation and progress of strategic infrastructure construction in the Far East, Soviet Union.

Therefore, this extremely detailed inquiry report is the most comprehensive, credible and elaborate first-handed historical data for us to study how the Soviet Union entered China to fight against Japan, taking advantage of the sovereign vacuum period when Japan has surrendered and the Chinese government has not immediately fully taken over the Japanese-occupied areas in the Northeast, and organized large-scale dismantling of industrial equipment and transshipment of various strategic materials to the Soviet Union. [3] The main purpose of the second archival material is to report to the President the size, total, type, and level of Japanese assets in Manchuria. It is an authoritative document for the study of Japanese imperialism's frantic looting and extraction of Northeast China. Combining these two archives, we can basically find out the tragic situation that China has just won the Anti-Japanese War, but suffered the Soviet Union's looting of industrial equipment, infrastructure and important materials in the Northeast.

The research on the demolition of equipment and the transfer of materials by the Soviet Union has not been carried out due to the lack of historical data. There is only a small amount of research results on the other side related to this, i.e., the research on the industry of the Japanese-occupied areas in the Northeast. Zhang Qing from Shenyang September 18th History Museum published two papers, *Preliminary Interpretation of Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria* [4] and *Research on New Views Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria* [5]. From the perspective of philology, she made a macro analysis and introduction of Japan's assets in the Northeast region revealed by Ambassador Polly's Assets Report. The Chinese translation and publication work was in progress shortly after the declassification of the US State Department's *Inquiry Report*. The author had no way of examining the situation of the Soviet Union's dismantling of Chinese industrial equipment in detail. In addition to the big data in the Assets Report, she could only cite rough estimates from the *December 1946 report of the United Nations Mission of Inquiry* [6] and *Report obtained by Chiang Kai-shek*. [7] So, many questions were unsettled, eg, what equipment and facilities were demolished by the Soviet Union from which places in the Northeast Japan-occupied areas, what materials and how many were transferred, who organized it, who executed it, how was it deployed and transported, and where was it transported to the Soviet Union, and etc. All the important questions about how the Soviet Union used these equipment and supplies have never been known in detail. Today, by interpreting the precious declassified file of the *Inquiry Report*, it is hoped that the relevant situation and details will be revealed to the world.

2. The Nature, Characteristics and Organization of the Soviet Union's Demolition and Transfer Operation

2.1. Nature

When Stalin learned that the United States had developed a new weapon of great destructive power, [1] and got the information that Japan might be defeated sooner. During the Yalta Conference, he proposed that one of the conditions for sending troops to Northeast China was to restore all the privileges and interests of Russia in Northeast China they once lost due to Russia's defeat in the Russo Japanese war. Then he 'planned to fully occupy the Japanese assets in the Northeast, destroy important industries and implement monopoly economic cooperation.' [8] Obviously, this operation of the Soviet Union is a state action with leadership, organization, plan, detailed arrangement and smooth transfer. It is decided, deployed and ordered by the supreme leader of the Soviet Union, and specifically implemented by the Soviet army and the Soviet people in China. [9]

2.2. Characteristics

The equipment and materials demolition and transfer executed by the Soviet Union have distinct characteristics:

The first is to choose the most advanced, complete and indispensable equipment. For example, advanced equipment imported from Germany, the United States, and Japan; the equipment produced by Japanese in the Japanese-occupied areas; the new equipment under construction; the equipment being installed and debugged as well as the equipment used for a short time. All these belong to the priority dismantling.

The second is to prioritize to ship arsenals for the production of various weapons and ammunition; ordnance and mechanical maintenance equipment and laboratory equipment.

The third is to dismantle and transport the equipment of high-tech enterprises and factories as much as possible, such as equipment for manufacturing and repairing aircraft and automobiles, metallurgical equipment, equipment for chemical experiments, production and testing, etc.

The fourth is to cherish military and civilian electrical equipment, mechanical equipment and various tools in great demand and wide application, such as generators, transformers, motors, lathes, locomotives, mills, etc. Article 38 of the *Inquiry Report* states: 'The Soviets dismantled almost all the generators, transformers and other machinery as well as equipment in the city, and transported them to Siberia via Dalian.' [10]

The fifth is to transport large quantities of materials encountered, discovered and confiscated to the Soviet Union

The sixth is the damage and loss caused by transportation and demolition of equipment are far greater than the economic value of the equipment itself. Due to time pressure and huge number of equipment, especially in the later transfer period, some equipment could not be dismantled or had been dismantled but could not be transported to the Soviet Union. As a result, neither the equipment that has been shipped to the Soviet Union nor the equipment that has not been shipped to the Soviet Union and still left in China can be reused again,

1 This refers to the atomic bomb. But at that time, the Soviet executives were not very clear about the practicality and lethality of this new weapon. The power of the atomic bomb that exploded over Japan was beyond anyone's imagination.

and many Chinese factories and enterprises cannot resume production or rebuild.

The seventh is to forcibly recruit and transport professional and technical personnel such as mechanics, engineers, designers, including prisoners of war, to the Soviet Union. It also carefully collected drawings of factories and equipment for their construction and equipment assembly.

Eighth, the Soviet Union took its own needs as the principle of dismantlement. As long as it is useful, even the equipment and property that do not belong to the Japanese invasion of China would also be dismantled. [11]

2.3. Organization and Implementation

According to the *Inquiry Report*, the Soviet Union firstly conducted a comprehensive inventory of the distribution, location, scale and status of factories, enterprises and material storage in the Japanese-occupied areas. Then, according to the type of factories and enterprises, the advanced level of equipment, the shortage situation of the Soviet Union and the completeness of facilities, several demolition options were listed, such as complete demolition of the factory, partial demolition and demolition of useful equipment only. The industrial layout designed by the Soviet Union top leaders determined the reception, storage, transshipment and placement of these equipment and materials. Then the top leaders worked out the specific demolition and transshipment sequence, scheme, transportation mode and route. Finally, they appointed the person in charge of each demolition and transfer period one by one and instructed them to implement it. Taking into account the shortage or vacancy of professionals, managers and ordinary technicians in the relevant domestic industrial sectors, the Soviet Union also escorted such personnel to the destination to serve them. The *Inquiry Report* contains several meticulous accounts of the Soviet deployment and execution of demolition work, such as: 'Usually a Soviet official will investigate a workshop and mark items that need to be dismantled'; 'Machine equipment was usually smeared with oil. greased, wrapped in a tarp, and boxed. The assembly drawings would be translated into Greek and English, and the factory plan would be stuffed into the box of the machine.' 'The Soviets carefully studied the upcoming disassembled machine structure. After the equipment was removed from the base, each machine was divided into different sections; each section had such a large number of parts, which are marked with letters in black pen. … The checklist included the identification of the location of parts, the composition of the equipment and the location of the equipment in the factory. When packing, a lot of stuffing, planks, and nails were put to isolate the equipment; steel hooped boxes were also a safety measure. When transporting, the type of machine was engraved on the case.' [3] The destination for shipment to the Soviet Union was also clearly marked on the box.

For the specific task of dismantling, most of the on-site organizers were Soviet officers or technicians. 'Sometimes the Soviet Union would also send a Japanese workshop supervisor to be responsible for the dismantling'. [10] In addition to the Soviet army, the demolitionists included factory workers and Japanese soldiers. A large number of social personnel, including Chinese citizens, were also hired to participate in the systematic time-constrained, heavy-duty, and large-scale demolition. Usually, Japanese prisoners of war were forced labor, and social workers were paid laborers. An American intelligence officer was once hired to demolish a textile factory and tire factory in Shenyang. He said that 'supervision is very tight' and 'the daily pay for work is 30 yen.' [12] The *Inquiry Report* shows that when the Soviet Union demolished the Dafengman Hydropower Station, 5,000 Soviet soldiers, 4,000 Japanese prisoners of war and 800 Japanese civilians were used. In order to dismantle the Nanman Arsenal in Wenuantun village, Fengtian city, the Soviet army drove 3,000 Japanese and 2,000 Chinese to work for it since November 30, 1945.

3. Chinese Demolition Sites and Soviet Resettlement Sites

Table 1. *Distribution of Demolition Sites in China.*

place	Name of the town/city	total
Liaoning province	Anshan Wafangdian Dandong Jinxian Zhoushuizi Yingkou Dalian Fuxin Fushun Miaotun Kaiyuan Fengtian liaoyang Benxihu	14
Jilin province	Changchun Xi'an (Liaoyuan) Yanji Siping Dunhua Tumen Longjingcun Yongji Jixijiangjiatun	8
Heilongjiang province	Haerbin Fulaerji Dongning Jiamusi Mudanhe Songhuahe	7
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	Hailaer	1

The *Inquiry Report* lists the locations in China of the equipment dismantled by the Soviet Union in terms of intelligence sources, and some are as detailed as the name of the factory. All ways as known to directly ship or transship to Soviet Union are clearly documented. The overall situation is that the equipment and materials demolished and transferred covered 30 cities and towns in the entire northeastern Japanese-occupied areas at that time—today's three

northeastern provinces and parts of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Among them, there are 14 in Liaoning province, 8 in Jilin province, 7 in Heilongjiang province and 1 in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In addition, along the Songhua River, many dams with power facilities have also been reduced to equipment demolition sites. The specific distribution is shown in Table 1.

After being transported to the territory of the Soviet Union, equipment and supplies were placed in 49 towns. The distribution is characterized by the Siberia region, located along the Amur River. Because it is adjacent to the northeast of China and it is convenient to transfer valuable technical war criminals from the Soviet concentration camps. The towns that received a large number of equipment and supplies were Vladivostok (Haishenwai in Chinese), Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk, Chita, Irkutsk, Krasnovsk, Taishet city, Uz Tikanchatsk town and other towns. Cities located in the northern and western regions of Lake Baikal, between Ulan-Ude and Krasnovsk are also important receiving areas. The western port city of Krasnovsk, located in the central part of the Soviet Union, in what is now Turkmenistan, and the westernmost economic complex, Leningrad (St. Petersburg), also received machinery and laboratories. Table 2 below for details of accepting and resettlement cities and towns.

Table 2. *Resettlement towns in Soviet Union (in alphabetical order).*

Initials	name	total
	Artukhovo	
A	Artem	3
	Artem---Grace	
	Beluha Mountain	
	Birzai	
B	Birsk	6
	Blagoveshchensk	
	Burkachacha	
	Bukika	
	Carlino	
C	Chelyabinsk	4
	Chita	
	Coulidur	
E	Emsk	1
H	Holmsk	1
I	Iman	2
	Irkutsk	
	Kadaya	
	Khabarovsk	
K	Kitoi	6
	Krasnoyarsk	
	Krasnovsk	
	Kurenzurai	
L	Leningrad (St. Petersburg)	1
	Magdagach	
M	Makaryevo	3
	Manzovka	
	Natchki	
N	Nikolayesk	4
	Normoline	
	Novobaikal	
	Shimanovsk	
S	Smolensk	3
	Sukhovsk	
T	Taishet	2
	Tomusk	
	Uglovka	
	Usbenovka	
U	Usri	5
	Ustkamenogorsk	
	UstKamchatsk	
	Vanino	
V	Vladivostok	3
	Voroshilov	
Y	Yelofi-Pavlov City	2
	Young Pioneer City	
	Zaschita	
Z	Zima	3
	Zrovin	

4. Mode of Transportation and Routes

In order to seize time and increase efficiency, the Soviet Union adopted a combination of sea, rail, road, and air to transport equipment and materials. The vast majority were carried by air, followed by sea and rail. The choice of transportation mode depended not only on the traffic conditions in China and the Soviet Union, but also on the geographical location of China and the Soviet Union. The main departure and distribution centers in China were Port Fushun, Dalian and Harbin. Equipment and materials shipped from the first two places may be reloaded in Vladivostok or transferred by train to inland Siberia for assembly, storage or distribution. Harbin, the northern transportation hub, has become the largest and busiest land and water transportation distribution station because of the railway lines towards the eastern, western and northern China, connecting with the Soviet Union. In order to increase the railway capacity and more rapidly transport equipment and materials to its Siberia region, the Soviet dispatched about 6,000 workers to work continuously for three months to widen the railway track from Fushun to Harbin. [13]

5. Dismantling of Machinery and Equipment of Factories and Enterprises in Each Demolition Site

According to the records of the *Inquiry Report*, the Soviet Union dismantled and scrambled the equipment of 75 factories, enterprises and one poison gas research institute in Japanese-occupied areas. Liaoning Province had as many as 45 factories and enterprises dismantled and had the largest financial loss Followed by Jilin and Heilongjiang, with 16 and 14 respectively, and finally Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, with 1.

Except for Yongji, Jilin province, where the names and numbers of the objects to be demolished were not yet clear, the names of all other demolished factories and enterprises are clear and specific. the details are listed in Tables 3 to 6 below.

Table 3. *Liaoning province.*

place	factory & enterprise	total
Anshan	Manchuria Steel Works Showa Steel Works Anshan Japanese Steel Works Anshan Steel Plant	4
Wafangdian	Wafangdian Bearing Company	1
Dandong	textile mill paper mill light metal plant	3
Jinxian	Jinxian Heavy Machinery Factory Jinxian Heavy Machinery Works Jinxian Manchuria Steel Plant	3
Zhoushuizi	Manchuria Coal Liquefaction Company	1
Yingkou	Yingkou Brick and Tile Factory	1
Dalian	Dalian Dahua Special Steel Plant Manchuria Fertilizer Plant Manchuria heavy industry co. Manchuria oil co. Dahua Steel Works Manchuria Chemical Plant Manchuria Refinery Dalian Broadcasting Corporation Dalian Shipping Company Southern Manchurian Railway Company Dalian Machinery Company Shinwa heavy steel mill Manchuria Railway Company	13
Fuxin	Fuxin Coal Mine Fuxin Power Plant	2
Fushun	Manchuria Light Metal Factory	1
Miaotun	Miaotun Refinery	1
Kaiyuan	Kaiyuan Poisonous Gas Laboratory Kaiyuan Railway Company	2
Fengtian	Zhuanghe Thermal Power Plant Toyo tire co., ltd. Arsenal (East of Railway Station) Southern Manchuria Arsenal (Wenguan Tun) Manchuria industrial machinery factory Tiexi Industrial Center Dehe Textile Factory Fengtian Air Force Maintenance Plant Shenyang Arsenal	9
Liaoyang	Japanese arsenal rubber factory	2
Benxihu	Benxihu Large Steel Plant Benxihu coal mine	2

Table 4. *Jilin province.*

place	factory & enterprise	total
Changchun	textile mill Manchuria Special Steel Works Manchuria machinery co., ltd.	4
Xi'an (Liaoyuan)	Southern Manchuria Soda Company Xi'an Aircraft Factory	1
Yanji	Yanji Refinery Yanji Cement Plant Dafengman Artificial Refinery Co. Dafengman Hydropower Station Japan air brake Co.	5
Siping	Coal Liquefaction Plant flour mill	2
Tumen	lumber mill	1
Longjingcun	lumber mill	1
Dunhua	OJI Paper factory branch	1
Yongji	unknown	

Table 5. *Heilongjiang.*

place	factory & enterprise	total
Jixijiangjiatun	Manchuria Fuel Plant	1
Haerbin	Songjiang Aircraft Factory car factory Harbin Power Plant Harbin Railway Company	4
Fulaerji	Manchuria Chemical Plant Thermal power plant	2
Mudanjiang	steam automobile Factory train factory paper mill Manchuria Telephone Company Manchuria Telegraph Company	5
Dongning	Manchuria bearing production Co..	1
Jiamusi	paper mill	1

Table 6. *Inner Mongolia.*

place	factory & enterprise	total
Hailar Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	Hailar arsenal	1

These factories, enterprises and research institutes covered 21 major fields, and the number varied from 1 to 12. The specific number is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen from Figure 1, the demolition of factories and enterprises by the Soviet Union covered almost all industries in the Japanese-occupied areas, especially iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, machine manufacturing, military industry, electricity, shipping, oil, airplanes and automobile manufacturing. These industries and core sectors were the backbone of national development strategy at that time., but suffered the most, accounting for 74.67% of all dismantled factories and enterprises. Dalian and Changchun had the largest proportion of demolition. As the largest industrial city in the three northeastern provinces, the former had as many as 13 large factories and enterprises whose equipment had been completely or partially dismantled. For the latter, the data provided by the *Inquiry Report* is that '70% of the factory equipment was dismantled by the Soviets.' [10] In areas with very underdeveloped industries, such as Hailar, which is now in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, there was only one factory at that time - Hailar Arsenal. After it was dismantled, the area became an area without any modern industry.



Figure 1. *Type and quantity of dismantled factories and enterprises.*

6. The Type and Quantity of Equipment Dismantled by Each Factory and Enterprise

The *Inquiry Report* records the types and quantities of equipment dismantled in the Soviet Union at macro and micro levels. Macroscopically, as stated in the introduction of 'Overview of Manchuria', the Soviet Union dismantled about 70% of the steam locomotives and carriages from Manchuria, 35% of the freight car carriages, 100 Emperor steam locomotives and almost all the first-class passenger carriages including an undetermined number of cars, vans and trains. In addition, the *Inquiry Repor*t contains several sporadic accounts of what kind of equipment in a certain town shipped to the Soviet Union, but no quantity is provided. There were a lot of equipment discovered by US intelligence officers in the Soviet Union, but they only knew that they were shipped from the Japanese-occupied areas in northeastern China, but did not know the exact origin. For the convenience of presentation, this type of equipment is allocated to the 'Material Category' below.

Microscopically, some items in the *Inquiry Report* are listed the names and numbers of the types and quantities of the factories and enterprises to be dismantled; other items only are listed how many tons of equipment, how many trucks, etc. They are summarized and recorded in descriptive methods, so the figure is impossible to be comprehensive and accurate.

However, we can still use this information to grasp the scale of losses and the extent of damage caused by the Soviet demolition.

The *Inquiry Report* clearly recorded the degree of dismantling of 46 factories and enterprises. Among them, as many as 30 were recorded as 'complete demolition', accounting for 39.68% of the total number of 76 factories and enterprises (laboratories) that were demolished, and 65.22% of the total number of factories and enterprises with records of demolition. It can be seen that the devastating damage is the most serious. The degree of demolition of another 6 enterprises is recorded as a percentage, the highest is 95%, and the lowest is as high as 60%. Most of the rest have quantified their degree of dismantling in various ways, but there are still some factories and enterprises that we only know what equipment has been dismantled, but not the quantity. We only know the quantity of some of the equipment and materials from the factories and enterprises that have been dismantled and transported, and do not know the other part. Table 7 below is the classification and breakdown of the demolition degrees of these 46 factories and enterprises according to various records and estimation methods in the *Inquiry Report*. Among them, the dismantling situation data has two different intelligence sources, and they are listed separately in the table for reference.

Table 7. *Degree of Demolition.*

Demolition (1)

Dismantle and transport all				**Partial disassembly and transportation**		
Serial number	**name**	**Serial number**	**name**	**Serial number**	**name**	**quantity**
1	Dandong Textile Factory	16	Dafengman kerosene company	1	Changchun Textile Factory	50
2	Dandong Paper Mill	17	Manchuria Telephone Company, Mudanjiang	2	Manchuria machinery factory, Fengtian	457
3	Dandong Light Metal Factory	18	Mudanjiang Telegraph Company	3	Jinxian Manchuria Steelworks, Liaoning	166
4	Changchun Manchuria machinery Co.	19	Experimental equipment of Manchuria Light Metal Factory , Fushun	4	Dahua Special Steel Plant, Dalian	66
5	Jinxian Heavy Machinery Factory, Liaoning	20	Liaoyang Japanese Arsenal	5	Manchuria heavy industry Co.	2
6	Jinxian Heavy Machinery Factory, Liaoning	21	Liaoyang Rubber Factory	6	Dalian Machinery Company	4sets (500types)
7	Zhoushuizi Manchuria Coal Liquefaction Company's coking plant, Liaoning	22	Benxi Lake Large Steel Plant, Liaoning	7	Fuxin Power Plant, Fuxin	12
8	Yingkou Brick and Tile Factory, Liaoning	23	Benxihu Coal Mine, Yingkou	8	Harbin Power Plant	10
9	Dahua Steel Works, Dalian	24	Siping Coal Liquefaction Plant, Jilin	9	Fuller Machine Manchuria Chemical Plant, Heilongjiang	110boxes; 152sets; 91machines
10	Dalian Manchuria Refinery	25	Si ping flour Mill, Jilin	10	Fulaer Thermal Power Plant, Heilongjiang	7
11	Dalian Broadcasting Corporation	26	Tumen Timber Factory, Jilin	11	Dafengman Hydropower Plant, Jilin	6
12	Southern Manchurian Railway Company, Dalian	27	Longjingcun village Timber Factory, Jilin	12	Toyo tire Co., Fengtian	132
13	Fuxin Coal Mine, Liaoning	28	OJI Paper factory branch, Dunhua, Jilin	13	Fengtian Arsenal	more than 1500
14	Songjiang Aircraft manufacturing Factory, Haerbin	29	Dongning Manchuria Bearing Company, Heilongjiang	14	Shenyang Arsenal, Wenguantun, Fengtian	5000-6000
15	Xi'an Aircraft Factory, Liaoyuan, Jilin	30	Jiamusi Paper Mill, Heilongjiang	15	Mudanjiang Steam Automobile Factory	416

Demolition (2)

In proportion	More than half	Fulaer Thermal Power Plant, Heilongjiang	Jilin Yanji Japan air brake Co.				
	Half	Jilin Yanji Refinery	Yanji Cement Plant	Dafengman Hydropower Station			
	Percentage (%)	Changchun Southern Manchuria Soda Company	Manchuria Fertilizer Plant	Dalian Machinery Company	Shinwa heavy steel mill	Manchuria Light Metal Factory	Manchuria Chemical Plant
		90%	60%	95%	60%	95%	60%
By economic value of equipment	Name	Toyo tire company					
	Economic value	200 million yen					
By tonnage	Name	Southern Manchuria Arsenal (Wenguan Tun)	Shenyang Arsenal	Manchuria Light Metal Factory			
	Tonnage	5,000 tons	2,000 tons	1,0000 tons			

By means of trans-portation	Name	Jixi Jiangjiatun Manchuria Fuel Plant	Manchuria Light Metal Factory	Manchuria industrial machinery factory
	Truck	30 trucks	680 trucks	80 trucks

7. Types and Quantities of Materials Shipped from All Parts of the Japanese-Occupied Areas

In addition to dismantling and transporting the equipment of factories and enterprises, the Soviets also shipped a large amount of raw material, semi-finished products, railway rails and road studs, various electrical equipment in use, goods stored in various places and on trains, to all parts of the Soviet Union.

The *Inquiry Report* includes the following 19 pieces of information on the shipment of various materials and non-factory and enterprise equipment provided by intelligence officers. Some listed specific numbers, while others only mentioned what was shipped. Although the total cannot be counted, the huge losses can still be seen through this information.

1) The two-line railway from Dandong to Fengtian, the Soviets transported one line and dismantled the other.
2) From Dahua Special Steel Plant, Dalian, 1,000 tons of ingot iron, and metal raw materials such as tungsten, molybdenum and cobalt were transported away. All goods and various consumables stored in the warehouse were also transported away.
3) Copper, leather and canvas of Dalian shipping company.
4) The 1,000-ton aluminum block from Manchuria Light Metal Factory.
5) Cars and excavators in Harbin.
6) Steel rails, pipes, iron filings and steel rods in the Harbin Automobile Factory.
7) All tank cars, freight cars and steam automobiles of Harbin Railway Company.
8) Two-line railway tracks and spikes from Harbin to Sufenhe.[1]
9) The rails, machines, lathes, timber, wires and other materials in the carriages of the Manchurian trucks were all transferred to the Soviet trucks and shipped out.
10) Various repairing materials, ammonium sulfate, hydrochloric acid, pin acid, ammonium and nitrate of Fulaerji Manchuria Chemical Plant were transported away. The Soviet soldiers said to the Chinese, 'They stole a lot of dyes'. [10]
11) A large number of heavy machinery and personal items were transported away from Yanji.
12) Coal from Lishucheng city and Mishan Coal Mine. A war criminal said that each team loaded 60 tons of coal a day, and about 100 teams worked for 72 days. Based on the estimation of this volume, the total amount of coal shipped out reached 432,000 tons.
13) From September to November 1945, the Soviet Army dispatched Japanese prisoners of war to load the so-called Japanese materials they had captured onto the train. These materials are: 300 tons of picric acid, 700 tons of TNT explosives, equipment to manufacture these chemicals, and shipping equipment to transport 400 tons of gunpowder per month.
14) Electrical equipment on many dams along the Songhua River.
15) Most of the machinery, equipment and materials in the largest military warehouse in Mujiatun town, Changchun.
16) Almost all generators, transformers and other machinery and equipment in Fushun were dismantled and shipped to Siberia via Dalian.
17) Aluminum tools of Dalian Manchuria Chemical Plant.
18) On the cargo supply station 330 feet east of Khabarovsk railway station, the Soviet Union used 300 prisoners of war from Camp 16-1 and 150 prisoners of war from Camp 16-13 to unload planters, threshers, clothing, medical supplies, etc. from the Japanese-occupied areas in northeastern China.
19) The warehouse 990 feet northeast of Chita Railway Station stored wires, nails and communication equipment confiscated from Manchuria.

It is worth noting that the *Inquiry Report* did not provide any information on the dismantling of the equipment and materials from China mentioned in Articles 18 and 19 above, but American intelligence agents working in the Soviet Union clearly and positively stated that they came from Japanese-occupied areas in Northeast China.

According to the *Inquiry Report*, it can be seen that there are two types of equipment and materials that could not be transported away. The first type is the equipment that the Soviet Union needed to continue to use. Such as the two-track railway from Dandong to Fengtian, one line was dismantled and transported away, and the other line was kept for personal use. The second type is the equipment that the Soviets adopted a more beneficial, more direct and more convenient way of utilization because of the current situation and transportation capacity at that time. One of the ways is to replace Japan, restart factories and enterprises, convert raw materials into products, then supply them to the Soviet army and Soviet people, or ship them to the Soviet Union. For example, in the Manchuria Fertilizer Factory in Dalian, the Soviet Union used 1,000 workers to dismantle 60% of the equipment and transported it away, and then used the remaining un-disassembled machines to hire workers to produce a kind of 'ryutan bando', as coal compounds used for lighting, under the strict supervision of its officials. Another example is the Soviet army transported most of the equipment from Kaiyuan railway company to the Soviet Union, and handed the remnants of the company over to the Soviets to operate and manage. [14]

1 probably referring to Suifenhe. this city belongs to Heilongjiang Province at that time.

8. Utilization of Dismantled Equipment and Materials in the Soviet Union

As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union distributed and settled its dismantled equipment and materials in 49 towns. As of the time when the intelligence officer submitted the information, these equipment and materials were in different states at the various resettlement sites. Some had been re-installed and put into use, some were in the process of being installed, and some were still stored in warehouses or under construction or planned. According to the *Inquiry Report*, a total of 81 factories, enterprises and facilities in the Soviet Union have used these equipment and materials, including 18 thermal and hydropower plants, 7 locomotive repair plants, 7 steel plants, 5 paper mills, and 3 textile mills, 3 bituminous coal mines, 2 car manufacturing plants, 2 auto repair shops, 2 tractor repair shops, 2 sawmills and 2 substations. There are also 4 other factories under construction that are not known what kind of factories are piled up with machinery and equipment imported from the Japanese-occupied areas in China waiting to be installed. In addition, the Soviet Union built 4 new monorails with dismantled rails and road studs, and used equipment dismantled from China on three dams. It can be seen that the Soviet Union tried to make full use of the dismantled equipment and materials, and has made or will make contributions to its national economy and people's livelihood. [15] Specific data are shown in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2. *Statistics of dismantled equipment used in the Soviet Union.*

9. Conclusion

In short, during the management vacuum in the Japanese-occupied areas in Northeast China after the surrender of Japan and before the Chinese took over, the top management of the Soviet Union launched a large-scale, well-deployed, highly organized, and fast-moving national operation to demolish and rush to transport materials and equipment from the former Japanese-occupied areas in Northeast China. After 14 years of Japanese imperialist colonial rule in the Northeast [16], the Japanese-occupied areas in the Northeast suffered a disaster, and the areas could have developed from a high starting point and quickly rebuilt after the war lost the valuable foundations and opportunities exchanged by Chinese people's blood, life and humiliation. The entire process of industrialization in China was hindered and delayed, and the road to modernization became longer and more difficult to go. The Soviet Union, which held high the banner of justice and friendship, committed blatant looting and plundering in the name of helping the suffering Chinese. In essence, the Soviet Union and the Japanese invaders are birds of a feather. [17]

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