

Thinking for Oneself Is Thinking with Others: Enlightenment Reason and Gemeinschaftsgefühl

Cora Cruz

Department of Philosophy, The New School for Social Research, New York, USA

Email address:

coracruz13@gmail.com

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Abstract: It has been a perennial puzzle that Kant's notion of reason, or thinking, must be taken as necessarily *sui generis*, and that construing it otherwise - say, as socially embedded and developmentally contingent - undermines the transcendental project: if thinking is historically contingent, it cannot be free. This might seem to reduce to the problem of the third antinomy, but I argue that it does not, and is not amenable to transcendental critique alone. Its solution requires its own existential analytic, an examination of reason's prior structures. This can be accommodated by the Kantian architecture, in which the outlines of a constitutive intersubjective orientation are already to be found. In what follows, I re-examine the Kantian paradox of autonomy and spontaneity in light of psychoanalytic traditions and current research in cognitive science, to make the case that, even for Kant, "thinking" is not only "intersubjective" from the ground up; it is also as "affective" as it is "rational". In addition to the *a priori* structures contributed by the understanding, imagination, and pure forms of intuition, there is a further *a priori*, implicit in the Third Critique, which can be considered "relational". This ties in well with Alfred Adler's notion of "Gemeinschaftsgefühl", in which both affective and cognitive capacities converge in the idea of social feeling as a marker of psychological health. In this sense, Adler inherits the Kantian legacy but corrects practical reason of what has been construed as its rationalistic and solipsistic bias.

Keywords: Consciousness, Corticocentrism, Representational Thought, Affect, Ego, Id, Autonomy, Heteronomy

1. Introduction

Sapere Aude. When Kant writes his *Beantwortung* for the *Berlinischer Monatsschrift* on the question of Enlightenment in 1784 [7], it is already a popular topic in intellectual circles. It is the era, after all, of the French and American revolutions, of Voltaire and Rousseau, of the demise of feudalism in favor of a bourgeois-liberal political economy, for which the conditions of possibility were not only the legal protection of private property, facilitation of free trade and the accumulation of capital, but concomitantly a new sort of independence of mind. "Thinking for oneself", or more literally, having the courage to be wise, has become a motto, Kant admits. But what can this mean, exactly? He tells us what it doesn't mean: letting others do our thinking for us, as when we rely on books, pastors, or doctors for, as he puts it, our understanding, our conscience, or our practical well-being. And he tells us why we do this: we are immature, lazy and cowardly, all too willing to allow others to dominate us,

to spare us the trouble of thinking for ourselves, even while paying lip service to Enlightenment ideals (and, presumably, though this would be Nietzsche's observation, not Kant's, whilst resenting this domination). We wish to remain children. We fail to take responsibility for our own minds, setting up superintendents to do it for us. And yet there are the revolutions, the demands for freedom and equality. What is it all about?

Kant's solution in this essay is perplexing. "Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!" Freedom of public speech, by which he means in particular, freedom in scholarly discussion and dispute, should be guaranteed, is his recommendation. Then, once the "propensity and vocation to free thinking" has "gradually worked upon the character of the people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom", it will "affect the principles of government, which [will] find it to its advantage to treat men, who are now more than machines, in accordance with their dignity". Meanwhile, private use of reason (speech or

freedom, as you will), should remain curtailed: the division of labor must be upheld, each should do their job and without complaint “obey” in civic life. If this is Kant’s solution, then what was the problem? Whence the emphasis on civil obedience? One might point to the historical threat of popular unrest at this juncture, but one need only recall Plato’s concern in the *Republic* with job specialization as it relates to the job of philosophizing, and it becomes clear that there is a complex and intrinsic connection between political-economic divisions of labor and “thinking”. Simply put, who exactly is to do the thinking, and what does this mean for what “thinking” is? Who gets to do philosophy? Is it everyone’s job, or just that of a select few? If the washerwoman should wash, and the post office clerk, the farmer, bricklayer, baker, maid or soldier persevere dutifully at their appointed tasks, then is Kant’s freedom merely the freedom of the scholar? If that is so, then what is freedom, and thinking, really for? What is its subject matter, if it is severed from the business of everyday life? Each should think for themselves, Kant maintains. And yet in this piece it is still a top-down affair: the intellectuals will debate on abstruse matters of belief and metaphysics, and this will translate (somehow) into better principles for the government, which would, Kant assures us, then govern more justly. The “great portion of mankind” is reproached for its indolence and timid childishness because it will not think for itself; yet it is only by virtue of better treatment by its guardians that it can in the end attain its dignity.

But of course a dignity which is conferred, without having been earned, is no dignity at all. Wherein lies the average person’s adulthood, their autonomy? It is hardly original to point out the contradiction in Kant’s admonition about immaturity when it appears, in this essay at any rate, that his only concern is the “thinking” of librarians and clerics, while the “men” of daily life should, in his view, continue in their vocational status as obedient children. The notion of Enlightenment “reason” as a hypocritical cover for oppression and false consciousness has been beaten at least to death. Nevertheless, there is value in what Kant’s *Beantwortung* makes explicit. His answer here is certainly unsatisfactory, but the problems it sets into relief give us a special overview of what is at stake in Kant’s *oeuvre* [8-11], and what may in fact be well answered in it. “Immaturity” is (by definition) a psychological and developmental issue, as are character traits such as courage or cowardice, laziness or industriousness. They are contingent phenomena embedded in biological, social and political contexts. We don’t need a proof that for Kant, thinking occurs among and with others, and that “thinking for oneself” is only a special case (a normative one) of thinking with others: this is self-evident. To be precise: if it is a question of maturity, of character, then it is self-evident that “thinking for oneself” is a kind of thinking that has developmental and circumstantial prerequisites. Nevertheless, Kant’s entire transcendental project hinges on the idea of reason as *sui generis*, whether as the reflective stance that can step back, as it were, to critique itself and its powers; as cognitive faculties which bring to

experience what the things in themselves cannot provide; as a practical will that need not bend to the mechanics of causal determinism; or as disinterested aesthetic judgment, purified of inclination or desire. Not to mention the supremacy of “reason” in judgments of the sublime - its triumph over human limitation and vulnerability. In what sense, then, may we speak of a kind of thinking, or rationality, or good will, which must on the one hand be developmentally and contextually dependent, but must, on the other, be autonomous, the source of itself, and in this way free?

2. Autonomy and Heteronomy

It might seem, *prima facie*, that with this we merely confront again the problem of the third antinomy: absolute spontaneity (causality of freedom), or causal determinism (mechanical laws of nature). The thesis (argument for spontaneity) and antithesis (argument for causal mechanism) are both sound, therefore the dialectic unresolvable unless we admit the regulative use of reason, which “adds in” what constitutive reasoning - empirical inquiry and proof and schematizing under concepts - can never demonstrate, namely final cause and therewith the freedom of a purposiveness that can neither be proved or disproved, rather derived transcendently. Transcendental arguments proceed differently than inductive or deductive proof: we begin with what all agree transpires, and then reason to the best explanation of the conditions of its possibility. We think purposively, and must assume both final ends and spontaneous causes as heuristic guides in our empirical investigations. Therefore, there is some way in which spontaneity and final cause exist, but they are not empirical entities, neither substances nor laws of nature, but something added in by the process of reasoning itself. We might apply the same transcendental procedure to the question of *Aufklärung*: thinking for oneself is possible, we assume it happens, it is the basic assumption, the very premiss under which the philosopher operates. Likewise with character traits such as maturity, courage, or their inverse, and so forth. They evidently exist. What makes them possible? If they are functions of environment, or upbringing, then they are causally determined and this undermines the fundamental definition of what they are: for if maturity is the capacity for free thinking, it cannot be a product of causal mechanism, for then it wouldn’t be what it is. Likewise with courage and the rest of the cardinal virtues (in addition to courage, these are temperance, justice, prudence) and theological virtues (faith, hope, love): for these are nothing, we may argue along Kantian lines, if they do not rest upon a good will, and a good will cannot be heteronomous (externally caused), for then it also wouldn’t be what it is, namely *sui generis* - a cause of itself. This is the remarkable admixture of hubris and humility in the Kantian system. We are enjoined, on the one hand, to restrict our metaphysical ambitions, to limit our speculative assertions to what can be given in experience and schematized conceptually under native and fixed types of judgments and categories. On the other hand, it is a condition

of the very possibility of critical thought that the latter, itself, is always more than it can ever cognize: it is never an object of knowledge for itself because then it would be an empirical substance, a causally determined thing, and that is the one “thing” that reason can never be. We must assume it but can never know it - not as an object, anyway. And it is this “more” in no trivial way, not even in the way noumena are more than we can know, for the latter, it might be held, are mere by-products of the limits of our thinking, whereas the primacy of reason in its freedom is the very bulwark of our humanity - the *sine qua non* of our freedom and hence of our dignity. And yet we cannot legitimately inquire what it is. We know *that* it is, and we may reason *from* it.

The problem of “thinking for oneself” therefore does not quite reduce to the problematic of the third antinomy, for this antinomy is resolved, or dissolved, by means of the regulative use of reason and by the division of noumena and phenomena which necessarily accompanies the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles. It is one thing to accept that freedom, God, and immortality must be only regulative ideals, conditions for the possibility of cognition and good will but not empirically knowable things. It is quite another matter to accept that we cannot come up with any definite description of “thinking for oneself”, and therefore not contend with its material and political implications; that we must gloss over it, take it for granted, or avoid the subject. “Thinking for oneself” is the possibility of critique itself, and even if we may not hypostatize the issue, treat it as substance or thing to be empirically found “out there” in the world, we may employ transcendental-phenomenological means, bracket its existence, and describe its conditions of possibility. These conditions are notions of self, other, thinking, community, the relations between them, and the ways in which instantiated versions of these relations might support or inhibit what can be described as “thinking for oneself”.

3. Corticocentrism’s Implications

There have been attempts to square Kant’s criteria of first personal thinking with developmental accounts, notably by Longuenesse [13]. She draws out the implications of the two fundamental kinds of self-consciousness, or uses of the “I” as subject, in Kant, wherein the “I” ascribed to the consciousness of the unity of apperception makes it an “I” that is both directed at the world and ascribed to the thinker. Being attuned to the consistency and unity of one’s mental contents, in other words, cannot happen without simultaneously bringing about the accompanying consciousness of the “I” that does the thinking. Longuenesse notes that this corresponds well to Freud’s ego, both in its function vis-a-vis “reality” (the function which unifies and schematizes our representations), and in which, by doing so, it lends a sense of permanence and identity to the thinker. Additionally, insofar as the representations of one’s own body count as representations towards which attention is directed, the “I” as object of apperception becomes linked to

the “I” of the apperceiver. The more one is attuned to one’s representations, attends to them, tests them for consistency and orders them under concepts and judgments, the more the sense of an “I”, both as active mediator of the outside world, and as object for itself, emerges. Descartes may have been wrong (per Kant’s Paralogisms) to hypostatize the empirical “I” by ascribing to it permanence as substance, thereby confusing the “I” that accompanies apperception with the “I” as its object; but he was not wrong in holding that it is through thinking that the “I” comes to be, both subjectively and objectively. Longuenesse observes the agreement between this account of self in Kant, and Freud’s “Ich” [4], which is both a projected representation of the surface one’s body and simultaneously a reflexive consciousness of apperception.

For if, as Freud says, the representations of our own body plays a central role in our ego as an organization of mental processes whose functional role is to direct us to a world of objects and guide our action, then... there is no use of “I” that does not include at least a disposition to locate its referent as a physical thing among other physical things in an objective spatiotemporal world. Nevertheless, it is equally true that this self-location and self-reference would not even get off the ground unless our mental representations were ordered in what Freud calls “ego” and Kant “transcendental unity of apperception,” a unity that makes possible what Kant calls the consciousness of oneself as subject and thus the use of “I” in “I think”. If Kant and Freud are right in their respective accounts, this organization of mental events is a necessary condition not only for the use of “I” in “I think”, but also for any other use of “I” as subject and thus any use of “I” at all, whether “subject” or “as object”. ([13], p. 36)

Plausibly, a loss of proprioception might bring about a disconnect between the subjective and objective uses of “I”, and clinical examples of disembodiment [14] show this is more than an pseudo-philosophical mistake, as Wittgenstein would have it [17]. But Wittgenstein’s example of such a misidentification is important. He writes,

There is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have a tooth-ache. To ask “are you sure it’s you who have pain?” would be nonsensical... And now this way of stating our idea suggests itself: that it is as impossible that in making the statement “I have a tooth-ache” I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me. To say “I have pain” is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is. “But surely the word “I” in the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it; it points to himself...” But it was quite superfluous to point to himself.” ([13], p. 20).

As an example of an (impossible) error of misidentification, Wittgenstein’s thought experiment does more than establish that there is “no room” for such a mistake. For having a toothache is pain, and that is quite another matter than viewing one’s reflection in a mirror. It points to what Solms [15, 16] claims are two different ways in which the body is represented in the brain. There are, for

Solms, two distinct aspects of the body and they are associated with different aspects of consciousness. Firstly, we have the external body represented as an object, or image, which corresponds to Freud's ego as surface projection:

The first aspect of the body is neuroanatomically represented in somatotopic maps on the cortical surface, which are projections of sensory receptors on the surface of the body, relayed via modality-specific thalamic and cranial-nerve pathways. This aspect of body representation is conventionally equated with the cortical homunculus (the inverted little body-map that constitutes the primary somatosensory zone of the cortex). But it does not coincide with somatosensory cortex alone; it includes the projection zones of all the sensory modalities, which consist in equivalent maps of the other sensory receptor organs.... We may call this aspect of body representation the external body, for short... It is the form of the self that one perceives when one looks outward, at a mirror for example ("That thing is me; it is my body.") Other bodies are similarly represented... It should be remembered that motor maps, too, contribute to the image of the external body. The three-dimensional body image is generated not by heteromodal sensory convergence alone but also by movement. Movement produces sensation. The close relationship between movement and (kinesthetic) sensation is reflected in the anatomical proximity of the respective projection zones: the somatosensory and motor homunculi form an integrated functional unit. ([15], p. 5)

But secondly, Solms distinguishes this "self" from another aspect of the body, which he calls its internal milieu, the autonomic body, which corresponds to Freud's "id":

This aspect of the body is barely represented on the cortical surface. It is represented much deeper and lower in the brain. The structures that represent this aspect of the body pivot around the hypothalamus, but they also include the circumventricular organs, parabrachial nucleus, area postrema, solitary nucleus, and the like... We may call this aspect of body representation the internal body, for short. ([15], p. 6)

External and internal "bodies" cannot be separated, as Solms remarks, for:

Even at the level of the brainstem, the neural structures for internal body representation are surrounded by those for the external body, just as the sensorimotor body itself envelops the viscera. ([15], p. 6)

but there is a hierarchical relationship between them. Although the flow of information is both "bottom up" and "top down",

The arousal system associated with the internal body generates a different aspect of consciousness from that associated with external perception, and, moreover, the internal aspect is prerequisite for the external aspect. When endogenous consciousness is obliterated, exteroceptive awareness is obliterated too; however, the converse does not apply. ([15], p. 6)

The proof of this claim is Solms' findings in studies of hydranencephalic patients, in whom the cerebral cortex has been destroyed in utero, but who are demonstrably not only

awake and alert (and in this way conscious), but who also "experience and express a full range of instinctual emotions", including situationally appropriate responsiveness to caregivers and other environmental stimuli. Experiments with decorticated animals yielded the same conclusions. Damage to the upper brainstem, on the other hand, leads to total obliteration of consciousness. Solms uses these findings in an extremely intricate argument, part of which runs as follows:

Affects, or the basic emotions, are phenomenal states of the body-as-subject. They have various taxonomies but the best-known is Panksepp's classification - seeking, lust, fear, rage, care, grief, play; and these states generate specific motivations, such as curiosity, sensuality, trepidation, anger, affection, sorrow, joy. Affect is an intrinsic property of the brain... expressed in emotions, and emotions are, above all, peremptory forms of motor discharge. This reflects the fact that the changing internal conditions are closely tied to changing external conditions... because vital needs (represented as deviations from homeostatic set-points) can only be satisfied through interactions with the external world. Therefore, affects, although inherently subjective, are typically directed towards objects: "I feel like this about that" (cf. the philosophical concept of intentionality or "aboutness"). ([15], p. 7)

In other words: feelings, or "interoceptive sensory modalities", comprise the "bottom up" aspect of consciousness, but the hierarchy is for the most part an inverse one. Representing vital needs as they do, by way of homeostatic regulation, they are intrinsically about the world and as such, give us our most important information on it. Which is to say, the "id" is intrinsically conscious. Cortical consciousness, on the other hand, is a largely separate system, essentially secondary, hence its responsibility for so-called "secondary process". Its purpose is to contribute representational memory space, which "enables cortex to stabilize the objects of perception, which in turn creates the potential for detailed and synchronized processing of perceptual images... it generates *objects*." Among these objects is the representation of one's external body or "self". But in general the function of cortex is to generate "stable, representational 'mental solids' that, when activated (or 'cathected') by affective consciousness, enable the [subject] to picture itself in the world and to think." Returning, then, to Wittgenstein's example of the toothache, it would be impossible to be mistaken about the having of pain. To have a pain, or a feeling, is simply that. It would, however, be possible to be mistaken in any number of ways about the explanation for the pain, which is a product of secondary processing - manipulation of representations, or mental solids. One might tell oneself a story about a cavity, for instance, or a story about tiny men wreaking revenge for a past wrong, or perhaps about a peculiar message from an unseen divinity. The explanation chosen would direct action in "top-down" fashion. Depending on the success or failure of this action, and hence on the "real world" accuracy of the explanation, affective feedback, registered by way of

deviation from homeostatic set-points (free energy variation, or prediction error) can generate either vicious or virtuous circles, the “loops” described by systems theories. These successes or failures in turn generate their own representational objects, or memories. The more successful they are, the less prediction error (surprise) or homeostatic deviation (free energy) will obtain, and the less occasion there will be for consciousness, viz., the less need for revision of representational schemata (memory reconsolidation). This is the cognitive unconscious - it is automaticity [2], which is a function of cognitive *success*. The ideal of cognition, Solms remarks, is:

To forego representational (and therefore cortical) processing and replace it with associative processing - to shift from episodic to procedural modes of functioning (and therefore, presumably, from cortex to dorsal basal ganglia). It appears that consciousness in cognition is a temporary measure: a compromise. But with reality being what it is - always uncertain and unpredictable, always full of surprises - there is little risk that we shall in our lifetimes actually reach the zombie-like state of Nirvana that we now learn, to our surprise, is what the ego aspires to. ([15], p. 14)

The classical psychoanalytic scenario as modified by cybernetics is that thinking is literally painful. It is what becomes necessary when the pleasure principle, or automaticity, fails [15, 21]. It requires the rearranging of “mental solids”, or representational memory, and cortical capacity for this is biologically quite limited (though it appears to vary somewhat). Its prerequisite is frustration, failure, prediction error, delay of gratification - all synonymous - which spur executive function “secondary process” thinking, sequencing over time otherwise known as thinking ahead (virtual action). Alternatively, and presumably less effectively, such failure may also initiate hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, which Solms remarks is also a form of “thinking” or consciousness, though in his view, and in Freud’s, a more primitive form of it. Ferenczi [3] has characterized hallucinatory wish fulfillment as a kind of autoplasmic adaptation (the subject changing itself, directed inwardly), as opposed to alloplasmic adaptation (changing the world, directed outwardly). For Ferenczi, the relinquishing of a fantasied omnipotence is required for the establishment of a sense of “reality”, the epitome of which is scientific knowledge. Fantasied wish-fulfillment, or narcissistic formations, in one form or another, are the bases of neurotic and psychotic illness across psychoanalytic theories, but Solms reminds us this is still a conscious, if “primary process” kind of thinking. And the imaginative contents of such fantasizing may tell us much about what I will call our relational or social *a priori* - what must ideally, or transcendently (i.e. not derived from experience, “prior” to experience) be “added in” for social experience to be what it is. We will return to this in the next section. For now let us ascertain how developmental models may map onto the Kantian.

Critical thinking, or “thinking for oneself”, is an uncomfortable, disconcerting nuisance. Why else would

people avoid it? Why else would it require courage? It is hard work, extra work, to go about rearranging our mental furniture, when we might just as well settle down with the sofas and upholstery we’ve inherited. Our only possible motivation for it would be the failure of automated processes - problems of living which cannot be solved in the usual ways. Since such problems are constant and abundant, we need truths about the world, explanations that are accurate and effective, rather than metaphysical fantasy. Critique of the use of our reason is a way to ensure effective science, or at any rate a way to ensure such use takes primacy over mere speculation (that our truths be grounded in experience and proper use of method and judgment). Scholars, theologians, scientists, and intellectuals of all sorts do well to create, preserve, and continually expand our cultural capital - good explanations, works of theoretical value and accuracy. Not only should such theoretical infrastructure trickle down into better legislation, as Kant suggests; it should also constitute our mental resources at all times, for when reasoning to the best explanation, it is helpful to have good explanations, and not only myths and fairy tales, to hand. Still, not everyone has the time or training for theoretical work and even, or particularly, in intellectual endeavor, a division of labor is necessary. Perhaps Kant’s elitism can be excused? Does the washerwoman really need to read transcendental philosophy, or psychology? If intellectuals are the guardians of our epistemological and spiritual capital, what is available to everyone else? Very little, apparently. Watered down versions, perhaps, and snatches of this or that. Cliff notes. At best. What Solms complains of as the “cortico-centric fallacy” is a social and political problem as well - and one of enormous proportion. He remarks,

Sadly... Freud seems to have paved the way for the conflation of consciousness with cortical monitoring, thereby prematurely relegating unmonitored instinctual processes to the “unconscious” category. It is now clear that instinctual processes are conscious in themselves. ([15], p. 11)

Similarly, the mundane suffering (injustice) of the average person is the bottom-up instinctual and affective life of the political body. If this body is not to resort to primitive compensatory strategies, and its political superego not resort to repressive measures, if it is really to “think for itself”, then intellectual and material capital must somehow be more evenly distributed. Simply put, if the average person is to think for herself, it would help for her to have sound theoretical tools, as well as opportunity for their practical application. Critical thinking (“thinking for oneself”, rationality, consciousness) is not just a cortical affair, not just a top-down affair - not just, in other words, an intellectual affair. It is a holistic and primarily an affective function. It is also a question of instrumental, or utilitarian, reasoning. What might a Kantian framework say to this?

4. Gemeinschaftsgefühl

Alfred Adler was the first of the main dissenters from orthodox psychoanalysis, preceding Jung to break with Freud

and the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1911, founding his own Society for Individual Psychology in 1912. The sources of contention were differing views on sexual and aggressive drives, and significantly different models of mind. While Freud developed his topographical and structural paradigms, Adler maintained the central importance of the striving for mastery and the inferiority complex, inheriting and reworking Nietzsche's notion of resentment as central to psychopathology, the opposite and healthy pole of which was what he came to call *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* [1]. Whereas the neurotic or psychotic would seek to compensate for a felt inferiority through illusions of superiority, the purpose of which were to safeguard a fragile sense of self and deflect confrontation with a reality to which one did not feel equal, a healthy person would find realistic ways to build skill and competence, and cultivate a reciprocal sense of care and belonging in their community. Psychopathology was, in Adler's view, essentially antisocial, grounded in insecurity, fear and resentment. The cure was to find one's place in society in a way that appropriately matched one's interests and capacities. Therefore, the ways in which children were encouraged or discouraged in their upbringing and education assumed far greater importance for Adler than infantile sexuality and its stages. One criticism of his approach, however, has been that the notion of "social feeling" (sometimes translated as "social interest") has never been very precisely clarified. Throughout his writings, Adler refers to this feeling, or interest, sometimes as an emotion and sometimes as an aspect of rationality; sometimes as desire for the progress of mankind toward an ideal society; sometimes as concern for the well-being of one's fellow person; sometimes as pleasure in doing good and in the company of others; sometimes simply as hard work, perseverance and humility. *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* is the fulcrum of a flourishing life; but we never come upon much of a conceptual definition. Is it a Kantian good will? Is it the affirmative attitude of a Nietzschean Übermensch? Is it a Stoic notion, with its emphasis on self-scrutiny, restraint, equanimity and cosmopolitanism? Is it an Epicurean idea - tranquility, moderation and social cooperation? Adler employs Socratic methods of dialogue, so is it, perhaps, the ability to think critically, to "think for oneself"? What would this have to do with *Gemeinschaft*?

We began with Kant's answer to the question of Enlightenment, namely that its ideal is having the courage to think for oneself. We asked whether such courage, and such thinking, is *sui generis* or whether it is a question of cultivation, of individual and social development. This yielded an antinomy of sorts, similar to Kant's third antinomy of spontaneity and causal determinism, yet not reducible to it, for whereas Kant's antinomy is dissolved by the Critique, with its transcendental limits to speculative reason that leave a place for freedom, hence for morality and human dignity, with the question of thinking for oneself, this is not enough. We still have the problem of the relation between the individual and the community, and where "thinking" falls into it. To this end, we examined some recent attempts to

reconcile a Kantian model of mind with developmental accounts, saliently those of psychoanalysis and cognitive science. We examined notions of thinking and self, and found that just as "self" can refer to rather different entities, "thinking" or consciousness can also indicate very different processes. The Kantian "I" as the subjective accompaniment to the unity of apperception is distinct from the empirical "I", the body as object; so, too, consciousness and intentionality do not reduce to representational thought alone.

But the psychoanalytic and cybernetic groundwork still strike one as rather solipsistic - they seem primarily to be about the organizational structure of the individual mind, and though connection with the outside world and other subjects is certainly implied, it remains in the background, an open question for the most part. This has in general been a criticism of Freudian thought, and latter day trends in psychoanalytic theory towards relational and intersubjective theories have moved to correct it. With Kant, it is always a great tension: we have freedom and critical thought on one side, and the community and historicity on the other, which are surely important, for what would morality be, if not directed towards others, and what would science be, if not a tradition to be preserved and continued? And yet with Kant we must inevitably ask whether the integrity of a good will is an individual phenomenon or a social one, and of critique too, whether it belongs to the individual thinker or to the community as a whole. A detailed exposition of these questions is far beyond the scope of this brief paper, but we have a clue in Adler's notion of *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*. It was meant as a relational and constructivist approach in psychology, to correct and counteract in part the intrapsychic bias of Freudians, but insofar as it directs us toward instrumental reasoning, feeling and sociability, we are given a perspective on Kant which might, if not resolve, at least ease our suspicions about the latter's solipsism and elitism, as well as the sterile sort of "rationality" of which Kantians are often accused. In this direction, the following syllogism suggests itself.

Enlightenment thinking is associated with liberal democracy, as is the subject of liberal democratic economics, the utility maximizing individual [5]. Korsgaard [12] definitively challenged the opposition between deontological and utilitarian ethics, to argue that means-end reasoning just is what constitutes autonomous thinking, since when we match means to ends, we necessarily must devise universal maxims. To consider ends and tools and purposes, efficient and final causes, in other words, is to legislate universally: *if I want X, then Y is the means*. This cannot be a particular maxim, as it must hold whenever X is the end and Y is the means. Utilitarian thinking is not only compatible with the categorical imperative; to engage in it is to enact the categorical imperative. This will be the first premiss of our argument.

As to feeling and sociability, to point out the role of judgments of taste in cognition for Kant is not original [6, 12], but I will point it out anyway here. Cognitive activity and capacity are intrinsically bound to social feeling, and

Kant's description of aesthetic experience articulate why. Although it may be that judgments about beauty are higher order judgments, being more than mere preference for the agreeable and being in this sense "disinterested", they are in fact highly "interested". To judge something beautiful is to find that one's cognitive powers, imagination and understanding, are stimulated and quickened, and to find this pleasurable. Pleasure is a feeling of well-being. All is well, vital needs are being met, free energy is low. That in aesthetic judgments, this feeling necessarily coincides with the idea of communal agreement, that all in the community (per the *sensus communis*) must share this feeling and judgment, is not to make any empirical observation, as Kant is well aware. It may in fact be that no one agrees with my finding something beautiful; nevertheless, to find it beautiful, I not only experience the purposiveness and thriving of my cognitive faculties, but I have an *a priori* expectation - a fantasy, if you will, an as-if scenario - that everyone else agrees with me and participates in my feeling. Again, that this may in "reality" never transpire is irrelevant to the judgment itself: it is a transcendental matter. The judging subject "adds it in" to his experience when he exercises judgments of taste. This is the second premiss of our argument.

5. Conclusion

To conclude: "Thinking for oneself" in the Kantian vein just is to think with others. There is no separate self that first thinks alone, and then takes account *post hoc* of other subjectivities; rather, it is intrinsic to moral judgments that they universalize and to aesthetic judgments that one's own well-being is linked *from the ground up* with that of everyone else. This ties in well with cybernetic modifications of psychoanalytic frameworks, in which thinking, or consciousness, is primarily affective and in this way is intrinsically world-directed, or rather, intrinsically *of* the world. Heidegger was right (though perhaps somewhat unfair to Kant), and so also was Adler: both sought to correct what Solms calls a "cortico-centric" fallacy, namely the reduction of thinking to representational manipulation, to cortical monitoring alone. While representational thinking, or memory reconsolidation, is what characterizes the critical aspect of consciousness - the sequencing over time, the thinking ahead as virtual or simulated action, the delay of motor discharge, and the intuition we therefore have of "stepping back" from experience in order to gain perspective, this is embedded in a much larger process, in which "top down" and "bottom up" dynamics alternate in very complex ways. At any rate, a Kantian interpretation of *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* works well and is plausibly exactly what Adler had in mind: it involves feeling and not just thinking, although it involves thinking too. The autonomy of the individual is upheld in the utilitarian use of reasoning, which not only contributes to a person's "mastery" over environment and circumstance, but is also moral in the Kantian sense because it legislates universally - to devise

maxims in this way for myself is to devise maxims for everyone else. Such an autonomy is not antisocial, but rather the prerequisite for sociability. The political implication is of course the intrinsic relevance of material conditions to the categorical imperative. To construe such conditions as somehow irrelevant to even a Kantian practical reason and a Kantian freedom is no longer justifiable; it is a misunderstanding likely attributable to unanalyzed ascetic attitudes and vested interests of power. Moreover, distancing myself enough to be "disinterested" enough to contemplate beauty not only constitutes a certain delay of immediate gratification, opening the horizon to differentiating thought, but it connects me at a second order level with others. To cultivate my own cognitive abilities just is to deepen my connection with my community. To encourage and facilitate the capacities of others just is to encourage and facilitate my own. And "primary process" wish-fulfillment, hallucinatory simulations of narcissistic love and recognition, may be an inferior solution to needs (drives) if resorted to excessively in place of practical action, and if they do not give way to mature emotional independence; they also, however, come first, as Freud pointed out, and as we do well to remember. The fantasy of aesthetic experience, wherein the purposiveness of my own faculties becomes apparent to me in conjunction with my shared purposiveness in a universe of other subjectivities, is the primal, originally given ground from which all social feeling and motivation springs: the *relational a priori*, as it were.

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